Ratios and controls by Grosse, Richard H.
University of Mississippi
eGrove




Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/dl_hs
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Deloitte Collection at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Haskins and Sells
Publications by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.
Recommended Citation
Haskins & Sells Selected Papers, 1955, p. 227-244
Ratios and Controls 
B Y RICHARD H . GROSSE 
P A R T N E R , P ITTSBURGH O F F I C E 
Presented before the Pennsylvania Industrial Bankers 
Association, Bedford, Pennsylvania — April, 1955 
In January of this year your President sent to you a letter report 
setting forth certain "Smal l Loan Rat ios" which were prepared by the 
statist icians, under the direction of M r . E lmer E. Schmus, V i c e - P r e s i -
dent and Cashier, of The F i r s t National Bank of Chicago. Your Chai r -
man of Meetings has asked me to discuss the significance and impor-
tance of these ratios with respect to operating a smal l loan business. 
You wi l l note that I have captioned my talk "Ratios and Controls." 
When I learned that I was to talk for at least an hour I suggested that 
I be permitted to expand my discussion to include the following: 
1. The various types of defalcations or i r regular i t ies which 
occur in your business. 
2. The accounting procedures, reports, and systems of internal 
control which help to prevent such i r regular i t ies. 
3. Various auditing techniques which detect i r regular i t ies. 
I am sure that you wi l l see that I w i l l not be discussing two sepa-
rate and unrelated topics, because certain rat ios, if properly used, can 
become a very effective tool for management in controlling the opera-
tions of a smal l loan business. 
RATIOS 
During the course of our work with various clients engaged in 
manufacturing and sel l ing, we are sometimes asked questions along this 
line - How does our overhead compare with other companies? Are our 
sel l ing and general administrative expenses in line with other com-
panies? Is our gross profit ratio about r ight? Although these questions 
may not appear to be unreasonable, after a l i t t le deliberation it becomes 
obvious that average percentages or composite ratios can be misleading. 
Fo r example, sales pol ic ies may differ widely in that one company may 
se l l i ts products direct ly to its customers whereas another company 
may operate through distr ibutors. One company may be using the latest 
equipment and methods whereas the equipment and methods of another 
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company may be c lassi f ied as antiquated. Advert is ing expenditures may 
be budgeted on entirely different philosophies. And, of course, ac-
counting pol ic ies could differ substantially in that one company may 
value its inventories on the Li fo basis and the other on the Fi fo basis. 
The point I am making is that in comparing percentages and ratios 
misleading inferences can be drawn if l ike is not compared with l ike, or 
the bases on which the ratios were computed are different. 
The ratios we are going to discuss today, however, have one d is -
tinct advantage - basical ly, we are going to compare like with l ike. 
Whether you operate one office or a ser ies of offices the method of 
operation is fundamentally the same. The figures used in computing the 
ratios were compiled by The F i r s t National Bank of Chicago f rom audit 
reports and supplemental information furnished in questionnaires. The 
figures are those of the national companies, the so-cal led regional 
companies, and certain of the independents. Since these companies 
enjoy a major portion of the total volume it is believed the composite 
ratios reflect the trend of the industry as a whole. 
A s I stated before, certain ratios if properly used can become an 
effective tool of control. The letter sent to you in January contained 38 
ratios. Time w i l l not permit a thorough discussion of a l l these ratios 
so I have selected those ratios which should be watched and studied in 
connection with your daily operations. This does not mean that we 
should concern ourselves with these ratios only once or twice a year 
when they appear in the annual or semi-annual reports to your stock-
holders. 
We real ize, of course, that in order to compute, ratios it is neces-
sary to have rel iable figures readily available. Many companies do not 
bother computing current ratios because of the amount of work involved 
in accumulating figures with which to make such computations. Much of 
this unnecessary work can be avoided if we wi l l give a litt le thought to 
the daily, weekly, and monthly reports prepared at each loan office. 
If you are operating, say, ten loan offices, you should concern 
yourself not only with the ratios of the business as a whole but with the 
operations of each office. For example, if the percentage of loss to 
average notes outstanding for a l l offices is 1.90 but one of the offices 
shows a percentage of 2.40 you have been warned that this part icular 
office requires immediate attention. Later in my talk I w i l l discuss an 
actual case on this point that resulted in discovering a defalcation of 
sizable amount. 
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In order to obtain ful l benefit f rom any ratio or percentage, I sug-
gest that wherever possible, the following comparisons should be made: 
(a) Compare the ratio of each office for the month with the com-
bined ratio of a l l your offices for the month. 
(b) Compare this month with last month. 
(c) Compare this month with the same month a year ago. 
(d) Make the same comparisons shown in a, b, and c above on a 
cumulative basis. 
(e) Compare each year with previous years. 
(f) Where national, regional, or state ratios are available, com-
pare your results with these. 
Obviously, if after computing these ratios you merely f i le them in 
the bottom drawer of your desk they wi l l serve no useful purpose. On 
the other hand, if a certain office or your business as a whole does not 
measure up you are in a position to take the necessary steps to correct 
deficiencies. 
You are probably aware that many trade associations gather f ig -
ures and statist ics from their members for the purpose of making 
available to each member vital information regarding the operations of 
that part icular industry. If the Pennsylvania Industrial Bankers A s -
sociation is not doing this I wonder if you are not overlooking an oppor-
tunity of increasing the value of membership. 
Now, let us discuss those ratios which wi l l help us in controll ing 
our daily operations. Throughout these discussions my reference to 
ratio numbers w i l l be those used by The F i r s t National Bank of Chicago. 
Aggregate Average Outstandings 
of Loan Receivables (4) 
Aggregate Average Monthly Cash 
Collections (5) 
% Average Monthly Cash Pr inc ipa l 
Collections to Average 
Outstandings (6) 
What we are attempting to determine here is what is sometimes 
referred to as the Collection Factor, or the ratio of cash principal co l -
lections to outstandings. The aggregate average outstandings of loan 
receivables (No. 4) is determined by taking the final monthly t r ia l 
balance figures of outstandings for each of the twelve months and d i -
viding by twelve. In arr iv ing at the aggregate average monthly cash 
collections (No. 5) we exclude a l l renewal paper inasmuch as we are 
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only concerned with cash principal receipts. Dividing the results ob-
tained in No. 5 by No. 4 we obtain the ratio of average monthly cash 
principal collections to average outstandings, or No. 6. 
Admittedly, this ratio is a very general one, which averages out 
seasonal swings, but it certainly is less cumbersome to compute than 
attempting to analyze and accumulate actual monthly maturit ies. It is 
interesting in studying this ratio to compare it with the average amount 
of individual loan balances, and the average amount of individual loans 
made for the years ended December 31, 1948, 1953, and 1954: 
Year Ended December 31, 
1948 1953 1954 
% average monthly cash pr incipal co l -
lections to average outstandings 8.93% 7.35% 6.99% 
Average amount of individual loan balances. $187 $245 $251 
Average amount of individual loans made. . $236 $296 $305 
Perhaps the largest contributing factor to the above trend is that 
since 1948 the average borrower obtains a larger loan and pays it off 
over a longer period. This, of course, bears out the general economy 
of the nation in that the average borrower today has a greater income 
and a higher standard of l iving. Once again it should be remembered 
that we are studying composite averages and different areas may show 
quite a variation f rom these averages. 
Past Due Accounts (13) 
Let us assume that the assignment of No. 13 to this ratio has no 
part icular significance. Fo r many years smal l loan companies have 
classif ied their past due accounts as follows: 
(a) 90 day accounts - those accounts on which no collections of 
any kind have been received for 90 days or more. 
(b) 60-89 day accounts - those accounts on which no collections 
of any kind have been received for 60 to 89 days. 
(c) "interest only" accounts - those accounts on which interest 
and charges only were received in the last 60 days of the 
period. 
Experience has shown that due to the nature of the smal l loan 
business the above classif icat ion of analyzing past due accounts is the 
most real ist ic. A s we a l l know, even the borrower with the best of in -
tentions may have temporary diff iculties which prevent him f rom com-
plying with the original terms of his loan. In other words, the most 
pract ical approach in measuring delinquent accounts is to classi fy and 
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summarize them on the basis of activity in the accounts - - which, of 
course, means recent payments. 
Not only does this ratio give an indication of the efficiency of an 
office but later in my discussion I w i l l demonstrate how a defalcation 
was brought to light due to the improper handling of a monthly del in-
quent report. 
Once again, let us study the trend of past due accounts by ob-
serving the following composite rat ios: 
It appears that the foregoing percentages show a trend in the right 
direction in that the percentage of "interest only" accounts is on a de-
clining scale. 
% Loss Reserves to Notes 
Outstanding (16)  
% Loss to Average Notes 
Outstanding (17) 
% Recovery on Loans 
Charged Off (18) 
% Loans Renewed With In- 
creases of Unpaid 
Balances (19)  
% Loans Renewed Without 
Increases of Unpaid 
Balances (20) 
These ratios a l l belong to the same family and in order to get a 
complete picture we cannot discuss one ratio without considering a l l the 
others. And, of course, we should never lose sight of the definite con-
necting link between Past Due Accounts (No. 13) and actual write-offs 
and losses. 
Ratio No. 16 - % of loss reserves to notes outstanding-is deter-
mined by dividing the balances in the reserve for losses by the total 
note balances outstanding as of the same date. Sometimes questions 
are asked along this line - How much reserve should be set up? Why 
does Company A show a reserve ratio of 8% whereas Company B's r e -
Ratio To Outstanding 
Receivables 
December 31 
1949 1953 1954 
90 day accounts . . . . 
60-89 day accounts . . . 
"Interest only" accounts 
1.07% 1.61% 2.12% 
1.39% 1.38% 1.37% 
1.80% 1.46% 1.52% 
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serve is only 2% of the receivables outstanding? The reserve balance 
published by The F i r s t National Bank of Chicago shows a composite 
percentage of 3.61% at December 31, 1953 and 3.68% at December 31, 
1954. Being a composite percentage it is obvious that some companies 
included in the study at December 31, 1954 had a ratio of more than 
3.68% and some companies carr ied a reserve of less than 3.68%. The 
company that has been in business for a long time w i l l , of course, have 
the advantage of past experience. But past experience is not the only 
factor to be considered in determining the adequacy of a reserve for 
losses. In determining the adequacy of the reserve for losses at any 
part icular date each of the following factors must be seriously con-
sidered: 
(a) The company's past experience on losses and recoveries. 
(b) Conservat ism of the company's policy in writ ing off doubtful 
accounts. 
(c) The condition of the loan balances which is based on an ac-
curate and real is t ic aging schedule. 
(d) General economic conditions. 
If you operate more than one office, each office should be analyzed 
separately. The manager of one office may be more efficient than an-
other not only in making better loans in the f i rs t place but in following 
up on subsequent collections. A str ike in a one-industry town would 
certainly show a much different picture than the town that has several 
industries and no str ikes. 
You are probably aware that there are two methods of handling 
losses for federal income tax purposes. The charge-off basis permits 
you to take as a deduction a l l balances written off during the year, less 
a l l collections on accounts previously written off. On the reserve basis 
you are permitted to take as a deduction a reasonable addition to the 
reserve each year. But don't think you can reduce your Federal income 
taxes by taking as a deduction an unreasonable addition to your reserve 
for losses. The revenue agent examining your return wi l l apply the 
same factors I have just enumerated in considering the reasonableness 
of your reserve for losses. And it may cost you more than just the interest 
on a tax deficiency. In a recent case, the revenue agent took the posi -
tion that the additions to the reserve for losses during 1951, 1952, and 
1953 were excessive. The statute of l imitations had run on the year 
1951 so that the excessive provision had to be restored to income in the 
open years. Unfortunately, in this part icular case, the tax rate for 1951 
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was only 28-3/4% whereas both 1952 and 1953 were excess-profi ts 
years involving tax rates of 82%. Of course, one way of minimizing the 
grief and worry of wondering whether your tax return w i l l be accepted 
as f i led is to set up in your books for f inancial statement purposes a 
real is t ic reserve for losses on the basis I have mentioned, but for tax 
purposes deduct the accounts actually written off less recoveries on 
accounts previously written off. 
It should be remembered that Ratio No. 17 - % of losses to re -
ceivables - represents the ratio of the actual balances written off to the 
average notes outstanding. 
Ratio No. 18 - % recovery on loans charged off - represents the 
ratio of recoveries during the year to the total of accounts charged off 
during the year. Recoveries include amounts collected on accounts 
charged off during the year as wel l as recoveries on accounts charged off 
in previous years. It is interesting to observe that The F i r s t National 
Bank of Chicago notes that the percentage of recovery on loans charged 
off reflects the company's charge-off pol ic ies, for if recoveries are 
meager it i s apparent that loans are not charged off until they are prac-
t ical ly hopeless. It could, of course, mean that there is a lack of v ig-
orous collection effort or that the balances include bogus loans. 
The trend of losses can be easi ly observed f rom the following 
tabulation of composite percentages: 
1948 1953 1954 
Ratio of loss reserves to notes outstand-
ing (16). . . . 4.60% 3.61% 3. 
Ratio of losses (balances charged off) to 
average notes outstanding (17) 1.59% 1.90% 1. 
Ratio of recoveries to balances charged off 
during the year (18) 30.07% 21.90% 18.71% 
For the year ended December 31, 1954 the ratio of loans renewed 
with increases of unpaid balances (Ratio No. 19) to total loans was 
70.95%, whereas the ratio of loans renewed without increases of unpaid 
balances (Ratio No. 20) to total loans was only .59%. These percentages 
once again are based on statist ics furnished to The F i r s t National Bank 
of Chicago. These ratios are of importance in appraising the grade of 
renewal paper carr ied by a company. The interpretation made is 
that when an additional advance is made in the renewal of a loan, the 
company usually is satisf ied with the credit r isk of the borrower. Con-
versely, if the renewal is made without an increase of the unpaid ba l -
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ance, it usually signifies that the terms of the or iginal loan were not 
being met and that it became necessary to readjust such terms. 
Ratios (21) to (38) 
The F i r s t National Bank of Chicago states that Ratios (21) to (38), 
inclusive, are statist ical in character but that they have considerable 
value in indicating trends in the business. Let us compare some of the 
ratios relating to profits and expenses: 
Year Ended December 31 
1948 1953 1954 
total expense (including taxes) to gross 
76.49 86.31 85.08 
) gross income to total loans and purchases 
(30) 13.50 15.31 16.44 
, net profit to total loans and purchases 
(31) 3.16 2.15 2.40 
expense to total loans and purchases (32) 10.34 13.16 14.04 
net profit to average net worth (33). . . . 20.15 13.39 13.10 
It is quite clear f rom the foregoing that the cost of doing business, 
which includes taxes, has steadily cl imbed higher; or stating it another 
way, the net profit ratio (i.e., ratio of net profit to gross earned.in-
terest, etc.) has decreased from 23.51% for 1948 to 13.69% for 1953 and 
14.92% for 1954. 
CONTROLS 
As I pointed out at the beginning of my talk certain ratios, if pro-
perly used, can become a very effective tool for management in control-
ling the operations of a smal l loan business. However, we must recog-
nize at a l l t imes that this is only one method of controlling operations 
and detecting i r regular i t ies. 
In order to prevent i r regular i t ies it is necessary that every busi-
ness have a good system of internal control. How often you have heard 
this statement made. But in too many cases we hear the argument that 
an office is too smal l and that it is impossible to have a good system 
of internal control. Every effort should be made to provide for an ap-
propriate segregation of duties among employees. A lso keep in mind 
the desirabil i ty of rotating duties or employees. In assigning duties 
always keep this rule in mind - No one employee should begin and com-
plete a transaction. The following are just a few examples of what we 
mean by transactions: 
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Requiring a witness other than the person making the loan. 
Proceeds of a loan should be given to borrower by a person other 
than the person closing the loan. 
Credit veri f icat ion to be made by person other than the one who 
took the or iginal application. 
But most important, it is essential to make periodic checks to de-
termine that the system as outlined is actually working. 
By periodic checks I am not only referr ing to the annual or semi -
annual audits of your public accountants. You should provide systematic 
procedures of testing and checking to be followed by your managers, 
supervisors, and internal auditors. And if you are an officer of your 
corporation you might give some thought to making surprise vis i ts 
yourself to your various offices throughout the year. 
Rather than speak in generalities I should l ike to devote the re -
mainder of my talk to a discussion of actual cases of i r regular i t ies. As 
time permits I shal l elaborate on those controls which help to prevent 
i r regular i t ies and those auditing techniques which detect i r regular i t ies. 
However, I should l ike to emphasize that independent audits frequently 
bring i r regular i t ies to light, but because such audits are based on tests, 
assurance is not complete that they w i l l do so. In any event the mere 
citing of these cases should remind you that it could happen to you, and 
how important it is to be fraud-minded at a l l t imes. Some of these 
cases w i l l reveal a pitiful lack of fraud-sense. 
These cases are based upon reports that have come to my atten-
tion during the past three years. Fo r obvious reasons I have changed 
the names and locations. 
Case A - $1,000 
The cashier had abstracted cash receipts from recorded col lec-
tions and had prepared and recorded several deposit sl ips in the check 
book but had not deposited the cash in the bank. Copies of the deposit 
sl ips retained by the branch were not authenticated by the bank in ac-
cordance with the Company's instructions. The shortage was developed 
in connection with a surpr ise verif ication of cash on hand and on deposit. 
The previous examination of this office was made in November 1953 and 
the i r regular i t ies took place in late March and early A p r i l 1954. 
The cashier was released immediately after the i rregular i t ies 
were discovered and she agreed to reimburse the Company for the 
funds abstracted f rom the collections. The Company's procedures have 
now been changed to require each loan office to submit authenticated 
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deposit s l ips in support of each deposit shown on the daily report to the 
Executive Office, which is in accordance with a recommendation made 
in connection with the examination for the year ended A p r i l 30, 1953. 
Case B - $85,000 
A c la im in the amount of $85,000 has been f i led with the Casualty 
Company. However, it is believed that some portion of this amount can-
not be proven as part of the loss because some of the alleged borrowers 
cannot be located. 
Ways in which defalcation was perpetrated: 
a. Fict i t ious loans were placed on the records to substantiate 
improper withdrawals. 
b. The loan manager was purportedly working with an appliance 
dealer to defraud the Company by delivering old or faulty 
television sets instead of new ones. 
Customers claimed that the sets were sent back and the 
transaction canceled. However, the loans which financed 
the transactions were not canceled. 
In other instances customers believed the merchandise they 
had received was on approval only and did not real ize they 
had signed loan papers. 
In s t i l l other instances new sets were delivered, but when shop 
repairs were needed old sets were exchanged for the new ones. 
c. On at least one occasion two checks were drawn to reimburse 
the office working funds for the same loans. The shortage 
thus created was restored to the bank account on the same 
day the public accountants started their examination. 
d. Premiums for l i fe insurance collected f rom borrowers were 
not recorded or disbursed to the insurance companies. 
How the above facts were discovered: 
The statistics at the Home Office indicated a declining rate of 
interest was being collected at this office and a supervisor was 
sent out to investigate. 
Case C - $1,200 
During the course of the examination of this office it was noted 
by the auditor that loan office personnel had fai led to include on the 
monthly delinquent reports to headquarters nineteen accounts which 
under Company policy were apparently delinquent for over three months. 
Conversations by the auditor with the loan manager of ttie office failed 
to develop any logical explanation as to the reasons for the omission of 
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these accounts f rom the report. Another investigation was instituted. 
This investigation resulted in the determination that pr incipal and 
interest in connection with seven accounts aggregating $1,200 had been 
improperly withheld by the loan manager, It was also noted that the 
practice of withholding payments of pr incipal and interest and the sub-
sequent recording thereof and of changing dates of payment for the pur-
pose of improving delinquency had apparently gone on for some time. 
Case D - $4,500 
The i r regular i ty aggregated approximately $4,500, of which $3,600 
represented collections on pr incipal of instalments receivable and the 
remainder represented collections of interest income. 
The defaulter (cashier-record keeper) abstracted cash collections 
over a two-year period. The amounts of cash abstracted were not en-
tered in the cash receipts records and thus were not posted to the 
general records, but the portion of the abstractions representing co l -
lections on pr incipal was credited to the detail receivable account 
cards. Thus, an increasing "open" difference between the control ac -
count balance and the aggregate of the detail account card balances was 
created. The existence of this open difference was "concealed" at the 
t imes of the periodic taping (usually twice monthly) of the account card 
balances by the defaulter, who participated in such periodic tapings, 
through overstating the adding machine tape totals. 
The existence of the open difference between the receivable con-
t ro l account balance and the aggregate of the detail account cards was 
discovered by the auditors in connection with their examination of this 
office. The defaulter had taped the cards a few days previously, which 
taping had indicated that the detail cards were within a few dollars of 
the control account. After the auditors accounted for a l l intervening 
transactions between these two tapes, they refooted the Company's tapes 
of the ear l ier date and ascertained that the total was overstated $3,600. 
Confronted with these facts by the regional manager, together 
with the fact that ear l ier tapes had been found to have been overfooted, 
the defaulter confessed. 
The regional manager of the office has been severely cr i t ic ized 
by the Company for not discovering the matter ear l ier as he was re -
sponsible for taping the cards every four months, but has admitted that 
he merely compared account cards with tapes run by the loan office 
personnel without proving the accuracy of the tapes. 
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Case E - $15,000 
The amount of the shortage as f inally determined was approxi-
mately $15,000 and was created over a period of approximately two 
years. 
Two methods were used by the person responsible for the short-
age (secretary-cashier). The one most frequently used and which ac -
counted for the major part of the shortage was that of withholding pay-
ments, pr incipal ly ful l balance payments where accounts were paid off 
pr ior to their maturity. The second method which was used was in 
making fake loans. In a l l , there were approximately 150 items involved. 
Withholding of payments each month ranged f rom an aggregate of $45 in 
the lowest month to $1,900 in the highest month. 
The shortage was concealed in the following manner: 
When payments were made by customers and withheld, receipts 
were issued to the customers and their passbooks credited in 
the usual way. In many instances the payment was also 
credited on the account card but in no case was it entered in 
the cash records. 
In order to avoid excessive tape shortage, fake ledger cards 
were prepared and inserted in the f i les. These fake cards 
were credited f rom time to time with fictit ious payments to 
prevent their becoming delinquent and to prevent investigation. 
The person responsible for the shortage also made it a point 
to run the periodic tapes herself and to force the balance to 
arr ive at a smal l difference. When auditors arr ived and ran 
the tapes she was able to insert sufficient fake cards in the 
f i les to cover the shortages. 
The most important part of her plan to cover the shortage was 
the creation of deliberate confusion and disorder in the records 
so that no one could ever te l l exactly what was going on. 
It was her practice to make erroneous entries in the records 
with later erroneous corrections, to alter and change the 
records in a confused manner, to lose or misplace legitimate 
account records, etc. 
The tapes had not balanced with the control accounts for about 
three years. 
Fai lure of the cash drawers to balance daily was a common 
occurrence. 
Cards and documents on accounts were frequently missing. 
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The loan manager, f ie ld supervisor, and f ield auditors were a l l 
aware of this situation but no steps were ever taken to investigate it 
thoroughly or to correct it. It was always explained as being the 
result of a rapid turnover in personnel and an inabil i ty to obtain com-
petent employees in this area. 
The shortage was f inal ly developed as a result of an audit by a 
f ield auditor. The tape of the accounts which the auditor prepared was 
short of the control account. In checking the difference the auditor had 
the loan manager ca l l the cards to him and in doing so the manager 
noted a number of cards for accounts with which he was not fami l iar . 
Further, it appeared that the cards were typed on a machine that was 
different f rom machines used in the office. Investigation of these cards 
disclosed the i r regular i t ies. Because of complications involved it took 
several months to investigate the shortage. 
The f inal report issued by the auditor who conducted the invest i -
gation placed most of the blame on poor supervision and poor local 
management. His report also indicated that he felt that the field audi-
tors, who had been assigned by the internal audit department, were 
either incompetent or inexperienced. 
Case F - $5,500 
The i r regular i t ies were perpetrated during an eighteen-month 
period and involved twelve of the loan off ice's outstanding loan accounts. 
Ten of such i r regular i t ies represented bogus loans as to which 
the defaulter prepared fictit ious loan documents and one represented a 
bogus loan as to which a relative signed the loan documents as a " favor" 
to the defaulter. In each of such eleven instances the defaulter endorsed 
the name of the alleged borrower on the checks for the loan proceeds 
and cashed the checks at the loan office. The twelfth i r regular i ty 
represented an abstraction of a collection on a loan account for the 
balance thereof, $42.50. 
The i r regular i t ies were concealed (1) as to certain of the bogus 
loans by regular payments thereon by the defaulter so that they escaped 
attention as delinquent items and (2) as to the remainder of the bogus 
loans (as to which payments were delinquent) by improperly classifying 
the related account cards as current, or withholding the account cards 
f rom the f i les between t r ia l balances of the loan accounts. 
The i r regular i t ies were discovered by two of the Company's re -
gional managers in connection with their periodic balancing of the loan 
office's detail account cards with the control account. The adding ma-
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chine tape of the detail account cards run by the regional managers was 
short of the control account and investigation of this shortage revealed 
certain of the account cards applicable to the bogus loans "hidden" in 
a f i l ing cabinet not used for account cards. The defaulter divulged the 
i r regular i t ies upon being confronted with the "hidden" account cards. 
Case G - $49,000 
The assistant manager of this office had made 115 bogus loans. 
The loans were supported by documents which apparently bore a l l of 
the character ist ics of regular loan documents. Disbursements for the 
loans were made in a l l cases by Company check, signed in most in -
stances by the defaulter, and cashed in most instances at the loan office. 
The checks were endorsed with the names of the payees and the en-
dorsements were apparently a l l in different handwritings. Amounts 
taken ranged f rom $100 to $800 a loan and f rom $400 a month to $9,000. 
The i r regular i ty was concealed over a long period of time (about 
a year) because a l l of the records and documents surrounding the trans-
actions bore the normal evidences of regularity. In the case of the 
older loans, payments were made and recorded in the accounts so that 
they escaped attention as delinquent items. 
The i r regular i ty was discovered when the defaulter was on vaca-
tion and another employee was unable to locate one of the "bor rowers" . 
It is interesting to note the following with respect to the account 
cards and "loan documents" pertaining to the bogus loans: 
1. For the most part, "col lect ions" on the " loans" were recorded 
considerably after their due dates. Delinquencies in excess 
of two months were not unusual. 
2. Only one of the " loans" showed evidence of having been re -
financed by the Company. 
3. Numerous collections of insufficient amount (less than the 
monthly payments called for by the related "promissory 
notes") were noted to have been recorded on the account 
cards. 
4. Several instances were noted in which payments of two or 
three instalments were recorded as collected on the same 
day for the same " loan". 
5. Handwritten notes on some of the cards indicated that " loans" 
had been classi f ied as current at t imes when they were de-
linquent. 
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6. The collection effort record on the reverse of the account 
cards reflected contacts with "bor rowers" by only one em-
ployee, the defaulter. Comments on "collection effort" were 
in considerable detail and contained plausible explanations 
of the "borrowers' "financial condition and ability to continue 
"payments" on the account. 
Case H - $24,000 
The losses represent uncollectible loans of sizable amounts which 
were made on col lateral that (a) was non-existent, (b) was subject to 
other l iens, o r (c) was substantially over-valued. These loans were 
made by a branch manager and branch cashier in collusion with a used-
automobile dealer and a furniture dealer. 
Concealment of the shortages was effected as follows: 
(a) The loans were supported by notes, chattel mortgages, and 
other documentary evidence of the same nature as that used 
for other loans. A s long as the loans were in a "current" 
status, the accounting records as regularly maintained in the 
branch indicated no evidence that they were not bona fide. 
(b) When the loans became delinquent, they were included in the 
category of current loans in reports to the executive office. 
This prevented discovery by executive office off icials who 
reviewed the reports, because the total of the delinquent 
loans as reported did not appear to be abnormal. 
(c) The branch office is subjected to periodical v is i ts by a Com-
pany regional manager. This employee is supposed to review 
a l l of the loan records. Upon his v is i ts the records relating 
to these loans were withheld f rom him. The regional man-
ager fai led to balance the loan cards, although this was one of 
his duties to be performed on a loan-office visit . Con-
sequently, he did not know that cards were being withheld. 
These loans could not be concealed when the branch manager took 
his vacation and they were discovered by the regional manager. Upon 
their discovery the regional manager demanded an explanation of the 
branch manager who stated that the loans resulted f rom bad judgement 
on his part and represented ordinary bad debt losses. He stated that he 
had concealed the delinquencies on the stat ist ical reports because he 
feared that disclosure would result in his discharge for "bad judgement" 
in making loans. The regional manager, after an investigation, approved 
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the write-offs of the loans as bad debts and reported the losses to have 
resulted from bad judgment. 
The discovery of the elements of fraud in the documents sur-
rounding these transactions was made by the auditor in charge of the 
audit of the branch office. In performing a routine program operation 
he became aware of the large amount of the "bad debt" losses suffered 
by this office during the year under audit. He also was informed by 
Company employees that Company supervisory personnel had inves-
tigated the losses and had approved the "charge-of fs" as resulting from 
"bad judgment" on the part of the branch manager in extending credit. 
He noted that reports to this effect had been f i led by a Company regional 
manager and that the approvals of the "charge-of fs" had been duly given. 
However, he worked for three evenings until midnight examining the 
document f i les before he discovered the forged documents and evidence 
that the manager must have been aware of the col lateral insufficiency. 
One becomes concerned with the implications contained in this 
i rregular i ty. F i r s t , it has demonstrated that large amounts of money 
can be diverted f rom a smal l loan office over a long period of time by 
an employee acting in collusion with outsiders. Second, it showed that 
review and investigation by a Company supervisor was ineffective. 
Case I - $5,800 
The embezzlement was perpetrated through the recording on the 
books of bogus loans in the names of fr iends or former neighbors of 
the embezzler and in the names of apparently non-existent persons. 
The procedure employed in perpetrating the i r regular i t ies involved the 
obtaining of cash advances from the cashiers "to close loans after office 
hours" for which loan documents were turned over to the cashiers on 
the following morning. 
Concealment of the i r regular i t ies was attempted through the 
recording of "col lect ions" on the bogus loans (presumably f rom the 
proceeds of other bogus loans) and through the making of collection 
effort notations on the office records of such bogus loans in disguised 
handwritings indicating contacts with the "borrowers" . (The use of d is-
guised handwritings in connection with such notations appears to have 
been a very ingenious device, inasmuch as the appearance of more than 
one handwriting in the collection effort notations is usually considered 
to be evidence that more than one person has had contact with a "bor-
rower", giving the impression that such loan was "regular") . 
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The i r regular i t ies were discovered by another of the Company's 
employees when he attempted to contact two of the non-existent bor-
rowers during the vacation of the embezzler. 
Case J - $9,000 
The i r regular i t ies involve collusion between a used car dealer and 
the manager of a smal l office (who, the Company believes, were 
actually partners with respect to the used car operation) through the 
making of loans f rom Company funds in amounts far in excess of the 
col lateral value of the automobiles covered by the loans or, in certain 
instances, on non-existent automobiles. 
Such loans were made in the names of " f r iends" of the used car 
dealer. The Company holds sworn statements of most of such " f r iends" 
to the effect that they admit signing the loan papers and automobile 
tit les as an accommodation to the used car dealer but that the proceeds 
of the loans were turned over to the dealer. 
Concealment was attempted by maintaining "col lect ions" on such 
loans on a relat ively current basis, thus minimizing the possibil i ty that 
loan office col lectors would contact the persons in whose names the 
accounts were carr ied by the loan office. Further, the documents ev i -
dencing automobile t it les were withheld f rom the loan office f i les thus 
concealing the fact that the descriptions of the automobiles pledged as 
col lateral as shown by the loan office records did not agree with the 
descriptions shown on the tit les. (In general the loan office records 
indicated that the automobiles were of more recent manufacture than 
was actually the case, in order that the amounts of each loan might 
appear to be in line with the value of the automobile). 
The i r regular i t ies came to light upon investigation by the Com-
pany's regional manager as to the reason for the absence f rom the loan 
folder of the document evidencing title to an automobile pledged as 
col lateral to one of the i r regular loans. 
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing cases prove, among other things, the importance 
of making a l l employees take regular vacations. Further, I cannot 
over-emphasize the necessity for examinations of smal l loan companies 
being on a surpr ise basis. I also wish to emphasize the necessity for 
maintaining absolute control over the cash and the account cards until 
a l l the operations that require such control have been completed. E x -
perience shows that two of the most important audit procedures that 
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can be applied for the detection of i r regular i t ies in smal l loan offices 
are (1) balancing details of the accounts against the controls, and (2) 
test confirmation of the accounts. If the date of the examination is 
known to the loan office employees in advance, or if control is lost, 
even momentarily, the effectiveness of these two procedures may be 
largely destroyed. And, of course; these cases have undoubtedly proved 
the importance of being fraud-minded at a l l t imes. 
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